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Abstract
We consider 2-players, 2-values minimization games where the players’ costs take on two
values, a, b, a < b. The players play mixed strategies and their costs are evaluated by unimodal
valuations. This broad class of valuations includes all concave, one-parameter functions F :
[0, 1] → R with a unique maximum point. Our main result is an impossibility result stating
that:
• If the maximum is obtained in (0, 1) and F ( 1
2
) 6= b, then there exists a 2-players, 2-values
game without F-equilibrium.
The counterexample game used for the impossibility result belongs to a new class of very sparse
2-players, 2-values bimatrix games which we call normal games.
In an attempt to investigate the remaining case F
(
1
2
)
= b, we show that:
• Every normal, n-strategies game has an F-equilibrium when F ( 1
2
)
= b. We present a linear
time algorithm for computing such an equilibrium.
• For 2-players, 2-values games with 3 strategies we have that if F ( 1
2
) ≤ b, then every 2-
players, 2-values, 3-strategies game has an F-equilibrium; if F
(
1
2
)
> b, then there exists a
normal 2-players, 2-values, 3-strategies game without F-equilibrium.
To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to provide an (almost complete) answer on
whether there is, for a given concave function F, a counterexample game without F-equilibrium.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Framework
Concave valuations are concave functions from probability distributions to reals. In general, concave
functions find many applications in Science and Engineering. For example, in Microeconomic
Theory, production functions are usually assumed to be concave, resulting in diminishing returns
to input factors; see, e.g., [14, pp. 363–364]. Also, their concavity makes concave valuations
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especially suitable to model risk – see, e.g., [8, 10, 17]. Furthermore, concave functions are utilized
in transportation networks (see, e.g., [16]) and in wireless networks (see, e.g., [3]).
In this work, we study 2-players, 2-values minimization games with concave valuations for their
existence of equilibria. Equilibria are special states of the system where no entity has an incentive
to switch. A (minimization) game may or may not have an equilibrium under a concave valuation
(cf., [6, 12, 13]).
For our investigation on the conditions for existence of equilibria we consider 2-values games
with unimodal valuations:
• 2-values games are games where the players costs take on two values a and b, with a < b.
We consider a subclass of counterexample 2-values games, termed normal games, where (i)
there is no (a, a) entry in the cost bimatrix, (ii) player 1 (the row player) has exactly one a
entry per column, and (iii) player 2 (the column player) has exactly one a entry per row. So,
normal games are very sparse 2-values games offering a large degree of simplicity, which we
use as a tool for deriving our main impossibility result.
• Unimodal valuations are valuations that can be expressed as a one-parameter concave function
F with a unique maximum point. Many valuations, like E + γ · Var and E + γ · SD, are
demonstrated to be unimodal; E, Var, and SD denote expectation, variance, and standard
deviation, respectively, and γ > 0 is the risk factor.
The question about the existence of equilibria was first put forward by Crawford [6], who gave an
explicit counterexample game without an equilibrium for some concave valuation. Crawford’s game
was used as a gadget in NP -hardness proofs of the equilibrium existence problem for the explicit
valuations E+ γ · Var and E+ γ · SD [12] and CVaRα [13]; CVaRα denotes conditional valuation-at
risk and α ∈ (0, 1) is the confidence level. (It should be noted that the given reductions in [12, 13]
yield non-sparse games.) In contrast, our work deals with an abstract unimodal valuation V; this is
the first investigation into games without an equilibrium under a general class of concave functions.
Previous work has addressed specific concave valuations such as E+γ ·Var [11, 12] and CVaRα [13].
Our results provide an almost complete answer to the equilibrium existence problem for 2-
players, 2-values games with concave valuations. In short, we define a sequence of normal games,
and show that for every unimodal valuation F with F
(
1
2
) 6= b, there exists a game from the
sequence that does not have an F-equilibrium (Section 4). For the remaining case F
(
1
2
)
= b, we
provide matching existence results (Section 5).
1.2 Contribution in More Detail
We proceed with a detailed exposition of our results. Given a unimodal valuation V expressed by
the concave function F, we consider the value of x, denoted by x0(F), where F takes the maximum
value in [0, 1]. We are interested in the impact of x0(F) on the existence of V-equilibria or, as we
call them, F-equilibria. We obtain the following impossibility result as our main result:
• If x0(F) > 0 and F
(
1
2
)
6= b, then there is a normal 2-players, 2-values game without F-
equilibrium (Theorem 4.4).
The impossibility result is shown using a family {Cm : m ∈ N} of (m + 1)-strategies games; Cm
is defined as the 1-row, 1-column extension of a Toepliz combinatorial bimatrix, Dm, which defines
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an m-strategies normal game. Interestingly, the bimatirx game defined by Dm has a uniform F-
equilibrium, while in Theorem 4.1 we prove necessary and sufficient conditions for the uniqueness
of this uniform equilibrium. The impossibility result follows by proving, in Theorem 4.3, necessary
and sufficient conditions guaranteeing that Cm has no F-equilibrium. For example,
C2 =
 (a, b) (b, a) (a, b)(b, a) (a, b) (b, b)
(b, b) (b, b) (b, a)
 has no F-equilibrium if and only if F(1
2
)
> b.
To the best of our knowledge these are the first examples of 2-values games without equilibrium
for a class of concave valuations. The Crawford game has 3 values.
We compliment our main result by observing that if x0(F) = 0, then an F-equilibrium exists for all
2-players, 2-values games and is PPAD-hard to compute (Theorem 3.8).
Our main result leaves open the remaining case F
(
1
2
)
= b, for which we obtain matching existence
results:
• Every 2-players, 2-values, n-strategies normal game has an F-equilibrium when the unimodal
valuation F satisfies F
(
1
2
)
= b, and it can be computed in O(n) time (Corollary 5.8). This
existential result is derived in Theorem 5.7, where we determine efficiently a winning pair,
which defines an F-equilibrium. The algorithm runs in time O(n) and the supports in the
winning pair we determine have size 2.
• Every 2-players, 2-values, 3-strategies game has an F-equilibrium when the unimodal valuation
F satisfies F
(
1
2
) ≤ b (Theorem 5.9). The proof of this result is purely combinatorial. This
result nicely illuminates Theorem 4.3, which states that for F
(
1
2
)
> b, the game C2, having 3
strategies, has no F-equilibrium.
1.3 Other Related Work
Win-lose games are the special case of 2-values games where a = 0 and b = 1. Win-lose games
are as powerful as 2-values games when E-equilibria are considered. Abbott et al [1] show that
computing an E-equilibrium for a given win-lose bimatrix game is PPAD-complete.
Two different models of sparse win-lose bimatrix games have been considered in [4, 5]. In the
model of Chen et al. [4], for the row player each row, and for the column player each column of the
payoff matrix has at most two 1’s entries. In the model of Codenotti et al. [5], there are at most
two 1’s per row and per column for both players. So the model in [5] is inferior to the model in [4].
Recall that in our model, there is at most one a per column for the row player, and at most one a
per row for the column player. So our model is not comparable with the models in [4, 5]. In both
papers [4] and [5], polynomial time algorithms are given for win-lose games from the corresponding
model of sparseness.
Chen et al. [4] also show that approximating a Nash equilibrium is PPAD-hard in the model
where both matricies contain at most 10 non-zero entries in each row and in each column. Liu and
Sheng [9] extend this result to win-lose games when both matrices contain O(log n) 1’s entries in
each row and in each column. Bilo` and Mavronicolas [2] prove that is NP -complete to decide if a
simultaneously win-lose and symmetric 2-players game has an E-equilibrium with certain properties.
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1.4 Paper Organization
Section 2 presents the game-theoretic framework, together with some simple properties regarding
equilibria for 2-players, 2-values games, and the definition of normal games. In Section 3 we define
unimodal valuations, we demonstrate that common risk-averse valuations are unimodal valuations,
prove some simple properties of unimodal valuations, and consider the case of x0(F) = 0. Our main
impossibility result is presented in Section 4. Section 5 presents matching existence results. We
conclude in Section 6.
2 Framework
2.1 Definitions and Preliminaries
For an integer ν ≥ 2, an ν-players game G, or game, consists of (i) ν finite sets {Sk}k∈[ν] of
strategies, and (ii) ν cost functions {µk}k∈[ν], each mapping S = ×k∈[ν]Sk to the reals. So, µk(s) is
the cost of player k ∈ [ν] on the profile s = 〈s1, . . . , sν〉 of strategies, one per player. All costs are
non-negative. Assume, without loss of generality, that for each player k ∈ [ν], Sk = {0, . . . , n− 1},
with n ≥ 2.
A mixed strategy for player k ∈ [ν] is a probability distribution pk on Sk; the support of player
k in pk is the set σ(pk) = {sk ∈ Sk | pk(sk) > 0}. Denote as pskk the pure strategy of player k
choosing the strategy sk with probability 1. A mixed profile is a tuple p = 〈p1, . . . , pν〉 of ν mixed
strategies, one per player. The mixed profile p induces probabilities p(s) for each profile s ∈ S
with p(s) =
∏
k∈[ν] pk(sk). For a player k ∈ [ν], the partial profile s−k (resp., partial mixed profile
p−k) results by eliminating the strategy sk (resp., the mixed strategy pk) from s (resp., from p).
For a player k ∈ [ν], a valuation function, or valuation for short, Vk is a real-valued function,
yielding a value Vk(p) to each mixed profile p, so that in the special case when p is a profile s,
Vk(s) = µk(s). The expectation valuation is defined as Ek(p) =
∑
s∈S p(s)µk(s), with k ∈ [ν]. A
valuation V = 〈V1, . . . ,Vν〉 is a tuple of valuations, one per player; GV denotes G together with V.
We shall view each valuation Vk, with k ∈ [ν], as a function of the mixed strategy pk, for a fixed
partial mixed profile p−k. The valuation V is concave
1 if the following condition holds for every
game G: For each player k ∈ [ν], the valuation Vk (pk,p−k) is concave in pk, for a fixed p−k.
A Vk-best response is a (pure or mixed) strategy pk that minimizes Vk(pk,p−k) for a fixed
pk. In this work, we shall consider minimization games, where each player k ∈ [ν] is interested in
minimizing Vk(p), that is, each player seeks to minimize her cost.
The mixed profile p is a V-equilibrium if for each player k ∈ [ν], the mixed strategy pk is a
Vk-best response to p−k; so, no player could unilaterally deviate to another mixed strategy to
reduce her cost. In this case, we will say that player k is V-happy with p. We will be referring to an
E-equilibrium when the valuation is the expectation valuation (and E-happy is defined analogously).
A pure equilibrium is an equilibrium where all players play pure strategies.
We shall consider two properties defined in reference to best-responses:
Definition 2.1 (The Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation Property [11, Section 2.6])
The valuation V has the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property if the following condition
1Recall that a function f : D → R on a convex set D ⊆ Rm is concave if for every pair of points x, y ∈ D, for all
λ ∈ [0, 1], f(λy + (1− λ)x) ≥ λf(y) + (1− λ)f(x).
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holds for every game G: For each player k ∈ [ν] and a partial mixed profile p−k, if pk is a Vk-best
response to p−k, then, for each pair of strategies ℓ, ℓ
′ ∈ σ(pk), Ek(pℓk,p−k) = Ek(pℓ
′
k ,p−k).
We shall often abbreviate the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property as WEEP. We shall omit
reference to the game G when immaterial.
Definition 2.2 (The Optimal-Value Property [12, Section 3.2]) The valuation V has the
Optimal-Value property if the following condition holds for every game G : For each player k ∈ [ν],
and a partial mixed profile p−k, if p̂k is a Vk-best response to p−k, then, for any mixed strategy qk
with σ(qk) ⊆ σ(p̂k), Vk(qk,p−k) = Vk(p̂k,p−k).
We recall from [12, Proposition 3.1]:
Proposition 2.1 (Concavity ⇒ Optimal-Value) Assume that the valuation Vk(pk,p−k) is
concave in pk. Then, Vk has the Optimal-Value property.
In this work we focus on 2-players games with ν = 2, where for each player k ∈ [2], k denotes
the other player. A 2-players game G will be denoted as (αij, βij)0≤i,j<n, where αij = µ1(i, j) and
βij = µ2(i, j).
Furthermore, we focus on 2-values games, in which there are only two cost values a and b, with
a < b; that is, {µk(s) | k ∈ [2] and s ∈ S} = {a, b}. To exclude the trivial existence of a pure
equilibrium, we consider games where no (a, a) entries exist in the bimatrix (αij, βij)0≤i,j<n.
Now recall the definition of domination among strategies in the 2-players game G. For a given
mixed profile p, strategy ℓ dominates strategy ℓ′ with respect to σ(p2) if the following conditions
hold:
(1) µ1(ℓ, j) ≤ µ1(ℓ′, j) for all strategies j ∈ σ(p2).
(2) There is a strategy ĵ ∈ σ(p2) such that µ1(ℓ, ĵ) < µ1(ℓ′, ĵ).
We observe:
Lemma 2.2 Assume that the valuation V has the WEEP property. Then, for each player k ∈ [2]
and a partial mixed profile p−k, if pk is a Vk-best-response to p−k, then no strategy in σ(pk)
dominates some strategy in σ(pk) with respect to σ(pk).
2.2 Simple Properties
We now prove two simple properties used later in the paper. We begin with a sufficient condition
for a pure equilibrium for a 2-players, 2-values game:
Lemma 2.3 Consider a 2-players, 2-values game. If there is an E-equilibrium 〈p1, p2〉 with
|σ(p1)| = 1 or |σ(p2)| = 1, then there is also a pure equilibrium.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that |σ(p1)| = 1 with σ1 = {0}. By the WEEP,
there is α ∈ {a, b} such that µ2(0, j) = α for all j ∈ σ(p2). Since p is an E-equilibrium, this
implies that α ≤ µ2(0, j) for all strategies j ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}. Take now ĵ ∈ σ(p2) so that
µ1(0, ĵ) = minj∈σ2 µ1(0, j). We prove that the profile (0, ĵ) is a pure equilibrium:
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• Player 2 is happy with (0, ĵ): We have to prove that µ2(0, ĵ) ≤ µ2(0, j) for all strategies
j ∈ {0, . . . , n−1}. Since ĵ ∈ σ2 and p is an E-equilibrium, µ2(0, ĵ) = E2(p01, pĵ2) ≤ E2(p01, pj2) =
µ2(0, j).
• Player 1 is happy with (1, ĵ): We have to prove that µ1(0, ĵ) ≤ µ1(i, ĵ) for all strategies
i ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}. This is vacuous if µ1(0, ĵ) = a. So assume that µ1(0, ĵ) = b. By the
definition of ĵ, it follows that µ1(0, j) = b for all j ∈ σ(p2). Hence, E1(p01, p2) = b. Since p01
is an E-best response to p2, it follows that E1(p
i
1, p2) ≥ b for all strategies i ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}.
This implies that µ1(i, j) = b for all pairs of strategies i ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1} and j ∈ σ(p2).
Since ĵ ∈ σ(p2), this implies that µ1(i, ĵ) = b for all strategies i ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}. Hence,
µ1(0, ĵ) = µ1(i, ĵ) for all strategies i ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}.
The claim follows.
We continue to prove a simple property of E-equilibria:
Lemma 2.4 Consider a 2-players, 2-values game, with an E-equilibrium p = 〈p1, p2〉 with |σ(p2)| =
2. Define the mixed strategy p˜2 for player 2 with σ(p˜2) = σ(p2) and p˜2(j) =
1
2 for all j ∈ σ(p˜2).
Then, 〈p1, p˜2〉 is also an E-equilibrium.
Proof. Without loss of generality, take σ(p2) = {0, 1}. To prove that 〈p1, p˜2〉 is an E-equilibrium,
We consider each player separately:
• Player 2 is E-happy: By the WEEP for (p1, p2), E2(p1, p02) = E2(p1, p12); since 〈p1, p2〉 is an
E-equilibrium, E2(p1, p
0
2) ≤ E2(p1, pℓ2) for all strategies ℓ 6∈ σ(p2). Since σ(p2) = σ(p˜2), the
claim follows.
• Player 1 is E-happy: By the WEEP, there is a number α ∈ R with E1(pi1, p2) = α for all
strategies i ∈ σ(p1). By the linearity of Expectation, there are only three possible cases:
(1) µ1(i, 0) = µ1(i, 1) = a for all i ∈ σ(p1).
(2) µ1(i, 0) = µ1(i, 1) = b for all i ∈ σ(p1).
(3) µ1(i, 0) 6= µ1(i, 1) for all i ∈ σ(p1).
It follows that
E1
(
pi1, p˜2
)
=

a if µ1(i, 0) = µ1(i, 1) = a for all i ∈ σ(p1)
b if µ1(i, 0) = µ1(i, 1) = b for all i ∈ σ(p1)
a+ b
2 if µ1(i, 0) 6= µ1(i, 1) for all i ∈ σ(p1)
.
So in all Cases (1), (2) and (3), E1(p
i
1, p˜2) is constant over all strategies i ∈ σ(p1), and the
WEEP holds, so that E1(p1, p˜2) = E1(p
i
1, p˜2) for any strategy i ∈ σ(p1). Thus, it remains to
prove that player 1 cannot improve by switching to some strategy ℓ 6∈ σ(p1). Clearly,
E1
(
pℓ1, p˜2
)
=

a if µ1(ℓ, 0) = µ1(ℓ, 1) = a
b if µ1(ℓ, 0) = µ1(ℓ, 1) = b
a+ b
2 if µ1(ℓ, 0) 6= µ1(ℓ, 1)
.
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This is evident in Case (1). Note that in Case (2), it must also hold that µ1(ℓ, 0) = µ1(ℓ, 1) = b
for all strategies ℓ 6∈ σ(p1) since 〈p1, p2〉 is an E-equilibrium. So player 1 cannot improve in
this case either. In Case (3), since 〈p1, p2〉 is an E-equilibrium, it must hold that for all
strategies ℓ 6∈ σ(p1), either µ1(ℓ, 0) = µ1(ℓ, 1) = b or µ1(ℓ, 0) 6= µ1(ℓ, 1). So player 1 cannot
improve in this case either.
The claim follows.
2.3 Normal Games
We now introduce a restriction of 2-players, 2-values games to very sparse games that we call
normal games.
Definition 2.3 (Normal Game) A 2-players, 2-values game G is normal if it fulfills:
(1) There is no (a, a) entry in the bimatrix of G.
(2) Player 1 (the row player) has exactly one a entry per column.
(3) Player 2 (the column player) has exactly one a entry per row.
Note that the definition of a normal game is symmetric with respect to the two players. Also note
that excluding (a, a) entries, excludes the trivial existence of pure equilibria. We prove:
Lemma 2.5 Consider the normal game GV, where V has the WEEP. Then, GV has no V-equilibrium
〈p1, p2〉 with |σ(p1)| = 1 or with |σ(p2)| = 1.
Proof. Assume, by way of contradiction, that G has a V-equilibrium 〈p1, p2〉 with |σ(p1)| = 1. (By
the symmetry in the definition of a normal game, this assumption is with no loss of generality.)
Let σ(p1) = {i}. We proceed by case analysis. Assume first that |σ(p2)| = 1. Let σ(p2) = {j}.
By Condition (1) for a normal game, either µ1(i, j) = b or µ2(i, j) = b. If µ1(i, j) = b, then, by
Condition (2) for a normal game, there is a strategy î with µ1(̂i, j) = a. Hence, player 1 improves
by switching to strategy î. A contradiction. The case where µ2(i, j) = b is handled identically,
using Condition (3) for a normal game.
Assume now that |σ(p2)| > 1. By the WEEP, there is an α ∈ {a, b} with µ2(i, j) = α for all
j ∈ σ(p2). Since |σ(p2)| > 1, Condition (3) for a normal game implies that α = b. Again by
Condition (3) for a normal game, there is a strategy ĵ ∈ σ(p2) with µ2(i, ĵ) = a. Hence, player 2
improves by switching to strategy ĵ. A contradiction.
Note that Lemma 2.5 implies that a normal game has no pure equilibrium and that |σ(pk)| ≥ 2, k ∈
[2], for any V-equilibrium 〈p1, p2〉.
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3 Unimodal Valuations
3.1 Definitions
For each player k ∈ [2], define
xk(p1, p2) :=
∑
(s1,s2)∈S1×S2|µk(s1,s2)=a
p1(s1) · p2(s2) .
Note that xk is linear in each of its arguments: for each λ ∈ [0, 1],
xk(λ · p′k + (1− λ) · p′′k, pk¯) = λ · xk(p′k, pk¯) + (1− λ) · xk(p′′k, pk¯) .
We proceed to define:
Definition 3.1 (One-Parameter Valuation) For a 2-players, 2-values game, a valua-
tion V is one-parameter if for each mixed profile 〈p1, p2〉, for each player k ∈ [2], Vk(p1, p2)
can be written as
Vk(p1, p2) = F(xk(p1, p2)) ,
for some function F : [0, 1]→ R, with F(0) = b and F(1) = a.
We observe:
Lemma 3.1 For a 2-players, 2-values game, a one-parameter valuation V is concave if and only
if F is concave.
Proof. Consider the mixed profile 〈pk, pk〉 := (λ · p′k + (1 − λ)p′′k, pk), with λ ∈ [0, 1]. Recall the
linearity of xk in pk, for each player k ∈ [2]. Since V is a one-parameter valuation, for k = 1, we
get that
F(x1(p1, p2)) ≥ λ · F(x1(p′1, p2)) + (1− λ) · F(x1(p′′1, p2))
if and only if
V1(p1, p2) ≥ λ · V1(p′1, p2) + (1− λ) · V1(p′′1 , p2) .
Hence, V1 is concave if and only if F is concave. (The case for k = 2 is symmetric.)
We now introduce a restriction of one-parameter valuations.
Definition 3.2 (Unimodal Valuation) In the 2-values case, a one-parameter valuation
V is unimodal if F : [0, 1]→ R is a concave function with a unique maximum point.
By Lemma 3.1, a unimodal valuation V is concave. We shall often identify the unimodal valuation
V with the function F and refer to a V-equilibrium for a unimodal valuation V as an F-equilibrium.
Finally, we define x0 = x0(F) to be the value of x where F(x) takes its maximal value in [0, 1].
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3.2 Examples
Recall the Expectation E, Variance Var and Standard Deviation SD valuations. We shall consider
the valuations EVarγ = E + γ · Var and ESDγ = E + γ · SD, with γ > 0. Both EVarγ and ESDγ
are concave functions as the sums of two concave functions; hence, they have the WEEP and the
Optimal-Value property (Proposition 2.1). We first derive formulas for E, Var and SD in terms of
x. Fix a mixed profile 〈p1, p2〉. Then,
E1(p1, p2) =
∑
(s1,s2)∈S1×S2
p1(s1) · p2(s2) · µ1(s1, s2)
= a ·
∑
(s1,s2)∈S1×S2|µ1(s1,s2)=a
p1(s1) · p2(s2)
+ b ·
∑
(s1,s2)∈S1×S2|µ1(s1,s2)=b
p1(s1) · p2(s2)
= (a− b) · x1(p1, p2) + b .
So E is a one-parameter valuation with F(x) = (a− b) · x+ b. Note that F(x) is strictly monotone
decreasing in x for x ∈ [0, 1]. For Variance, we apply the “mean of square minus square of mean”
formula Var(x) = E(x2)− (E(x))2 for a random variable x, to derive
Var1(p1, p2) = (a
2 − b2) · x1(p1, p2) + b2 − ((a− b)x1(p1, p2) + b)2
= (a2 − b2) · x1(p1, p2) + b2 − (a− b)2x21(p1, p2)
− 2(a− b) · b · x1(p1, p2)− b2
= x1(p1, p2)(1− x1(p1, p2))(b − a)2 ,
which implies
SD1(p1, p2) :=
√
Var1(p1, p2) = (b− a)
√
x1(p1, p2)(1− x1(p1, p2)) .
Recently, Conditional Value-at-Risk [15] became very popular. CVaRα, α ∈ (0, 1) being the con-
fidence level, is recognized as a model of risk in volatile economic circumstances. For a discrete
random variable q taking on values 0 ≤ v1 < v2 < . . . < vℓ with probabilities qj, 1 ≤ j ≤ ℓ,
Value-at-Risk VaRα and Conditional Value-at-Risk CVaRα are defined by
VaRα(q) = min
vκ :
κ∑
j=1
qj ≥ α

and
CVaRα(q) =
1
1− α
 ∑
κ:vκ≤VaRα(q)
qκ − α
 · VaRα(q) + ∑
κ:vκ>VaRα(q)
qκ · vκ
 .
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3.2.1 The Valuation EVarγ
EVarγ is a one-parameter valuation represented by the concave function
Fγ1(x) := a · x+ b · (1− x) + γ · (b− a)2 · x · (1− x) ,
with Fγ1(0) = b and F
γ
1(1) = a. Note that
(Fγ1(x))
′ = (a− b) + γ · (1− 2x) · (b− a)2 ,
with
(Fγ1(x))
′
x=x0 = 0 ⇐⇒ x0 =
1
2
(
1− 1
γ · (b− a)
)
.
Since (Fγ1(x))
′′ = −2γ · (b − a)2 < 0 for all x ∈ [0, 1], it follows that Fγ1(x) has a local maximum
at x = x0.
To determine the monotonicity properties of Fγ1(x), we distinguish two cases:
• For γ · (b− a) ≤ 1, Fγ1(x) decreases strictly monotone for x ∈ [0, 1].
• For γ · (b − a) > 1, 0 < x0 < 12, and F
γ
1(x) increases strictly monotone for x ∈ [0, x0] and
decreases strictly monotone for x ∈ [x0, 1].
So, Fγ1 is a unimodal valuation. Further, note that F
γ
1
(
1
m
)
= am +
m− 1
m · b+ γ · (b− a)2 · m− 1m .
Thus, Fγ1
(
1
m
)
= b if and only if γ · (b− a) = m− 1m , for m ∈ N.
3.2.2 The Valuation ESDγ
ESDγ is a one-parameter valuation represented by the concave function
Fγ2(x) := a · x+ b · (1− x) + γ · (b− a) ·
√
x · (1− x) ,
with Fγ2(0) = b and F
γ
2(1) = a. We have
(Fγ2(x))
′ = (a− b) + γ · 1− 2x
2
√
x · (1− x) · (b− a) .
Note that (Fγ2(x))
′ < 0 for x > 12. Hence, we seek x0 <
1
2 with (F
γ
2(x))
′
x=x0 = 0. So,
(Fγ2(x))x=x0 = 0 ⇐⇒ γ ·
1− 2x0
2
√
x0 · (1− x0)
= 1
⇐⇒ γ · (1− 2x0) = 2
√
x0 · (1− x0) .
It follows that γ2 · (1− 4x0 + 4x20) = 4(x0 − x20), yielding
x0 =
4(γ2 + 1)−√16(γ2 + 1)2 − 16γ2(γ2 + 1)
2 · 4(γ2 + 1) =
1
2
− 1
2
√
γ2 + 1
.
Since γ > 0, it follows that 0 < x0 <
1
2. Since (F
γ
2(x))
′
x=0 = +∞ and (Fγ2)′x=1 < 0, it follows
that x0 =
1
2 − 12
√
γ2
is a local maximum of Fγ2(x), which is unique. Hence, ESD
γ is a unimodal
valuation for all values of γ > 0 and a, b with a < b. Further, note that Fγ1
(
1
m
)
= am +
m− 1
m ·
b+ γ · (b− a) ·
√
m− 1
m . Thus, F
γ
1
(
1
m
)
= b if and only if γ = 1√
m− 1, for m ∈ N.
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3.2.3 The Valuation CVaRα
CVaRα is a one-parameter valuation represented by the concave function F
α
3 (x):
If x < α, then Fα3 (x) =
1
1− α ·(1−α)·b = b, and if x ≥ α, then F
α
3 (x) =
1
1− α ·((x−α)·a+(1−x)·b).
Note that
VaRα(x) =
{
a, if x ≥ α
b, if x < α
So, Fα3 is a continuous function with F
α
3 (x) = b for 0 ≤ x ≤ α, Fα3 (1) = a and linear for α ≤ x ≤ 1.
As it does not have a unique maximum, it is not a unimodal valuation. Furthermore, since Fα3 (x) is
monotone decreasing in x, an E-equilibrium is also an Fα3 -equilibrium, but since F
α
3 (x) is constant
for 0 ≤ x ≤ α, this does not hold vice versa. So, an Fα3 -equilibrium always exists, but computing
an Fα3 -equilibrium is not necessarily PPAD-hard.
Observe that the WEEP does not hold for Fα3 . To see this, consider the game(
(a, b) (b, a)
(b, a) (a, b)
)
with α = 34 , p2(1) =
1
4 , p2(2) =
3
4 .
Then x1(p
1
1, p2) =
1
4 , x1(p
2
1, p2) =
3
4 , and F
α
3 (p
1
1, p2) = F
α
3 (p
2
1, p2) = b but E(p
1
1, p2) =
1
4 · a+ 34 · b 6=
E(p21, p2) =
3
4 ·a+ 14 ·b. So Fα3 does not have the WEEP. As we will show shortly, unimodal valuations
have the WEEP.
Finally, note that while for 2-players, 2-values games there always exists a CVaRα-equilibrium, this
is not true for 2-players, 3-values games. It is shown in [13, Theorem 6] that the Crawford game(
(2, 2) (1, 3)
(1, 3) (3, 1)
)
has no CVaRα-equilibrium.
3.3 Properties
We prove some properties of unimodal valuations. First we provide necessary definitions. Consider
a 2-players, 2-values game with a unimodal valuation V and a mixed profile 〈p1, p2〉. Then, we say
that player k ∈ [2] is V-constant on σ(pk), if Vk(p̂k, pk¯) remains constant over all strategies p̂k with
σ(p̂k) ⊆ σ(pk). The notion of a player being E-constant is defined similarly. We now show:
Lemma 3.2 For a 2-players, 2-values game with a unimodal valuation V, consider a mixed profile
〈p1, p2〉. For each player k ∈ [2], if k is E-constant on σ(pk) or if k is V-constant on σ(pk), then
xk(p̂k, pk¯) is constant for all p̂k with σ(p̂k) ⊆ σ(pk).
Proof. We consider first the case that player k ∈ [2] is E-constant on σ(pk). Since Ek(p̂k, pk¯) =
Ek(xk(p̂k, pk¯)) and the one-parameter function E(x) is strictly monotone decreasing in x, this
implies that xk(p̂k, pk¯) is constant for all p̂k with σ(p̂k) ⊆ σ(pk).
Now consider the case that player k ∈ [2] is V-constant on σ(pk). Assume on the contrary that
there exist p˜k,
≈
pk with σ(p˜k) ⊆ σ(pk) and σ(≈pk) ⊆ σ(pk) such that y = xk(p˜k, pk¯) < xk(≈pk, pk¯) = z.
Since Vk(p̂k, pk¯) = Fk(xk(p̂k, pk¯)) and since F is a concave function with a unique maximum, this
implies y < x < z where x is the position in which the unique maximum of F is obtained. The
properties of F imply additionally that F(x̂) > F(y) = F(z) for all x̂ with y < x̂ < z. Now
consider the mixed strategy qk =
1
2 p˜k +
1
2
≈
pk. It follows that qk ⊂ σ(pk) since σ(pk) is a convex set.
Furthermore, y < xk(qk, pk¯) < z and therefore F(xk(qk, pk¯)) > F(y) = F(z). This contradicts the
fact that Vk(p̂k, pk¯) = Fk(xk(p̂k, pk¯)) is constant on σ(pk).
11
Remark: Since E and V are one-parameter valuations, if xk(p̂k, pk¯) is constant on σ(pk), then
Ek(p̂k, pk¯) and Vk(p̂k, pk¯) are constant on σ(pk).
Lemma 3.3 A unimodal valuation V has the Optimal-Value property and the WEEP.
Proof. Consider a V-equilibrium 〈p1, p2〉. Since V is concave, V has the Optimal-Value property
(Proposition 2.1). Hence, for each player k ∈ [2], Vk(p̂k, pk) remains constant over all strategies p̂k
with σ(p̂k) ⊆ σ(pk). According to Lemma 3.2 and the remark following Lemma 3.2, this implies
that Ek(p̂k, pk) is constant on σ(pk). The WEEP follows.
As a special case, Lemma 3.2 immediately implies:
Corollary 3.4 For a 2-players, 2-values game G with a unimodal valuation V, consider the mixed
profile 〈p1, p2〉. For each player k ∈ [2], if |σ(pk)| = n, then k is E-happy with 〈p1, p2〉 if and only
if k is V-happy with 〈p1, p2〉.
Corollary 3.4 immediately implies:
Corollary 3.5 A 2-players, 2-values, 2-strategies game with a unimodal valuation V has a V-
equilibrium.
We now prove a necessary condition for the existence of an F-equilibrium, which we shall later use
repeatedly in the proofs of Theorems 4.1 and 4.3:
Lemma 3.6 Consider a 2-players, 2-values game G with a unimodal valuation F, and a mixed
profile 〈p1, p2〉 with the following three properties:
(1) There is a strategy î ∈ σ(p1) such that µ1(̂i, j) = b for all j ∈ σ(p2).
(2) For each strategy j ∈ σ(p2), there is a strategy i ∈ S1 with µ1(i, j) = a.
(3) It holds that F(x) < b for all x ≥ 1|σ(p2)| .
Then, p1 is not an F-best response to p2.
Note that Property (2) is always fulfilled when G is a normal game (Definition 2.3) due to Condition
(2).
Proof. Assume, by way of contradiction, that p1 is an F-best response to p2. By Lemma 3.3,
V has the WEEP. Hence, by Property (1), Lemma 2.2 implies that µ1(i, j) = µ1(̂i, j) = b for all
(i, j) ∈ σ(p1)× σ(p2). It follows that x1(p1, p2) = 0. Hence, F(x1(p1, p2)) = F(0) = b.
By Property (2), for each strategy j ∈ σ(p2), there is a strategy i ∈ S1 with µ1(i, j) = a;
call it i(j). Thus, for each strategy j ∈ σ(p2), i(j) 6∈ σ(p1). Set y := max{p2(j) | j ∈ σ(p2)}.
Then, y ≥ 1|σ(p2)| . Choose j˜ ∈ σ(p2) with p2(j˜) = y, and set i˜ := i(j˜). Then, V1
(
pi˜1, p2
)
=
F
(
x(pi˜1, p2)
)
= F(x), for some x with x ≥ y ≥ 1|σ(p2)| . It follows, by Property (3), that F(x) < b.
So player 1 improves by switching to strategy i˜. A contradiction.
We shall sometimes use Lemma 3.6 with the roles of the two players interchanged.
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3.4 The case x0(F) = 0
We observe:
Lemma 3.7 Assume that the unimodal valuation F is strictly monotone decreasing, and consider a
mixed profile p = 〈p1, p2〉. Then, p1 is an E-best-response to p2 if and only if it is an F-best-response
to p2.
Proof. Consider a mixed strategy p̂1 for player 1. Since both E and F are monotone decreasing in
x, we have that
F1(x1(p̂1, p2)) < F1(x1(p1, p2)) ⇐⇒ x1(p̂1, p2) < x1(p1, p2)
⇐⇒ E1(x1(p̂1, p2)) < E1(x1(p1, p2)) .
Hence, p1 is an E-best-response to p2 if and only if it is an F-best-response to p2.
Since E-equilibria are invariant to translating and scaling the cost values a and b, Lemma 3.7
implies that for a strictly monotone decreasing F, computing an F-equilibrium for a 2-values games
is as hard as computing an E-equilibrium for a win-lose game, where a = 0 and b = 1. The latter
is PPAD-hard [1]. Hence, computing an F-equilibrium for a strictly monotone decreasing F is
PPAD-hard. In the case x0(F) = 0, F is strictly monotone decreasing for x ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, we
obtain:
Theorem 3.8 For a unimodal valuation F, if x0(F) = 0, then an F-equilibrium exists for all 2-
players, 2-values games and its computation is PPAD-hard.
Recall that for γ · (b−a) ≤ 1, EVarγ is strictly monotone decreasing for x ∈ [0, 1] and EVarγ(0) = b.
Hence, x0(EVar
γ) = 0. Therefore:
Corollary 3.9 Computing an EVarγ-equilibrium, with γ · (b−a) ≤ 1, is PPAD-hard for 2-players,
2-values games.
4 Inexistence of Equilibria
We begin with a property about uniqueness of equilibria which will have the essential role in the
proof of the non-existence result. For this purpose, we introduce the 2-values, m-strategies bimatrix
game Dm, with m ≥ 2:
Dm =

(a, b) (b, a) (b, b) . . . (b, b) (b, b)
(b, b) (a, b) (b, a) . . . (b, b) (b, b)
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
(b, b) (b, b) (b, b) . . . (a, b) (b, a)
(b, a) (b, b) (b, b) . . . (b, b) (a, b)
 .
Thus, Dm = (αij , βij)0≤i,j≤m−1 is a Toeplitz bimatrix, with:
αij =
{
a , if i = j
b , otherwise
and βij =
{
a , if j = (i+ 1) mod m
b , otherwise
.
Clearly, Dm is a normal game. Thus:
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• For each strategy j ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m− 1}, there is a strategy i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , m-1} with αij = a.
This implies that any mixed profile 〈p1, p2〉 fulfills Property (2) from Lemma 3.6.
Note that for each player, there is exactly one a in every row and every column. This property is
stronger than Conditions (2) and (3) together in the definition of a normal game. We show:
Theorem 4.1 Consider a unimodal valuation F. Dm has the F-equilibrium 〈p1, p2〉, given by
p1(j) = p2(j) =
1
m , for 0 ≤ j ≤ m − 1. Dm has no other F-equilibrium if and only if one of
the following three conditions holds:
(i) m ≤ 3,
(ii) m is even, m ≥ 4, F ( 2
m
) 6= b and F(x) < b for x ≥ 2
m−2 ,
(iii) m is odd, m ≥ 5 and F(x) < b for x ≥ 2
m−1 .
Before proceeding to the proof, we present a property concerning the distribution of the b-values.
Definition 4.1 (b-blocks and b-double-blocks) Let A,B ⊆ {0, . . . ,m − 1} with |A| ≥ 1 and
|B| ≥ 1. Then,
(i) (A,B) is a b-block for player 1 if αij = b for all i ∈ A, j ∈ B.
(ii) (A,B) is a b–double-block if αij = βij = b for all i ∈ A, j ∈ B.
In a corresponding way, a b-block for player 2 is defined.
We show:
Lemma 4.2 Let A,B ⊆ {0, . . . ,m− 1}.
(i) If (A,B) is a b-block for some player k ∈ [2], then |A|+ |B| ≤ m.
(ii) If (A,B) is a b-double-block, then |A|+ |B| ≤ m− 1.
Proof. Note that |B| > 1 implies |A| < m and |A| > 1 implies |B| < m.
(i) We do the proof only for player 1. Note that αii = a for all i ∈ {0,. . . ,m-1}. So, if i ∈ A then
i /∈ B. This implies |B| ≤ m− |A|, and therefore |A|+ |B| ≤ m.
(ii) Note that for all i ∈ {0, . . . ,m−1}, αii = βi,(i+1)modm = a. So, if i ∈ A, then i, (i+1) modm /∈
B. Since |A| < m, |{i, (i + 1) mod m : i ∈ A}| ≥ |A|+ 1. This implies |B| ≤ m− (|A|+ 1),
and therefore |A|+ |B| ≤ m− 1.
The claim follows.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 4.1.
Proof. By the construction of Dm, for each player k ∈ [2] and for each strategy i ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1},
Ek(p
i
1, p2) = a · 1m+b ·m− 1m , which is independent of i. Thus, 〈p1, p2〉 has the WEEP. Since 〈p1, p2〉
is fully mixed, it follows that 〈p1, p2〉 is an E-equilibrium. Hence, by Corollary 3.4, 〈p1, p2〉 is an
F-equilibrium.
We now prove that the stated conditions are necessary and sufficient for uniqueness. First we show
that they are sufficient.
“⇐”: Consider an arbitrary F-equilibrium 〈p1, p2〉. We distinguish three cases.
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(1) (σ(p1), σ(p2)) is a b-double-block: Due to the structure of Dm, such a double-block of b’s does
not exist if m ≤ 4. Now let m ≥ 5. Due to Lemma 4.2, |σ(p1)|+ |σ(p2)| ≤ m− 1. Due to the
symmetry of Dm, we can assume that |σ(p1)| ≤ |σ(p2)|. Then, |σ(p1)| ≤ ⌊m−12 ⌋. We have to
distinguish even and odd m.
– If m is even, then |σ(p1)| ≤ m−22 , and by assumption F(x) < b for x ≥ 2m−2 . Therefore,
F(x) < b for x ≥ 1|σ(p1)| . Lemma 3.6 implies that p2 is not an F-best response to p1. A
contradiction.
– If m is odd, then |σ(p1)| ≤ m−12 , and by assumption F(x) < b for x ≥ 2m−1 . Therefore,
F(x) < b for x ≥ 1|σ(p1)| . Lemma 3.6 implies that p2 is not an F-best response to p1. A
contradiction.
(2) For some k ∈ [2], (σ(p1), σ(p2)) is a b-block for player k but not a b-block: Due to the sym-
metry of Dm, we can assume that k = 2. Then there is a pair (ˆi, jˆ) ∈ σ(p1) × σ(p2) with
αiˆjˆ = a. We first prove that for every i ∈ σ(p1), there is some j ∈ σ(p2) with αij = a.
Assume, by way of contradiction, that α
i˜,j
= b for some i˜ ∈ σ(p1) and all j ∈ σ(p2). Then,
for player 1, strategy î ∈ σ(p1) dominates strategy i˜ ∈ σ(p1) with respect to σ(p2). By Lem-
mas 2.2 and 3.3, it follows that no strategy in σ(p1) dominates some other strategy in σ(p1)
with respect to σ(p2). A contradiction.
Note that for all i, j ∈ {0, . . . ,m − 1}, αij = a if and only if j = i. So, i ∈ σ(p1) implies
i ∈ σ(p2). Therefore, |σ(p1)| ≤ |σ(p2)|. Lemma 4.2 implies |σ(p1)| + |σ(p2)| ≤ m, and
therefore |σ(p1)| ≤ ⌊m2 ⌋. We distinguish even and odd m.
– If m is odd, then |σ(p1)| ≤ m−12 , and by assumption F(x) < b for x ≥ 2m−1 . Therefore,
F(x) < b for x ≥ 1|σ(p1)| . Lemma 3.6 implies that p2 is not an F-best response to p1. A
contradiction.
– If m is even, then |σ(p1)| ≤ m2 . We have two subcases, |σ(p1)| < m2 and |σ(p1)| = m2 .
+ |σ(p1)| ≤ m2 − 1: By assumption, F(x) < b for x ≥ 2m−2 . Therefore, F(x) < b
for x ≥ 1|σ(p1)| . Lemma 3.6 implies that p2 is not an F-best response to p1. A
contradiction.
+ |σ(p1)| = m2 : By assumption, F
(
2
m
) 6= b. If F ( 2
m
)
< b, then Lemma 3.6 implies that
p2 is not an F-best response to p1. A contradiction. If F
(
2
m
)
> b, then the WEEP
implies that p2(j) =
2
m
for all j ∈ σ(p2). Thus V1(p1, p2) = F
(
2
m
)
> b and hence
player 1 can improve by using some strategy i /∈ σ(p1). A contradiction.
(3) (σ(p1), σ(p2)) is neither a b-block for player 1 nor a b-block for player 2: Then, there is a pair
(ˆi, jˆ) ∈ σ(p1) × σ(p2) with αiˆjˆ = a and there is a pair (˜i, j˜) ∈ σ(p1) × σ(p2) with β˜ij˜ = a.
Since in an equilibrium no strategy can dominate some other (Lemmas 2.2 and 3.3), for every
i ∈ σ(p1) there is some j ∈ σ(p2) with αij = a and for every j ∈ σ(p2) there is some i ∈ σ(p1)
with βij = a. A more elaborate proof was given in case (2).
Due to the structure of (αij)0≤i,j≤m−1, it follows that for every i ∈ σ(p1), we also have i ∈
σ(p2). Due to the structure of (βij)0≤i,j≤m−1, it follows that for every j ∈ σ(p2), we also have
(j−1 mod m) ∈ σ(p1). These two taken together yield that σ(p1) = σ(p2) = {0, . . . ,m−1}.
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By the WEEP for player 1, the expression
a · p1(i) + b ·
∑
i′∈{0,...,m−1}\{i}
p1(i
′)
is constant for i ∈ {0, . . . ,m − 1}, yielding the unique solution p1(i) = 1m for each strategy
i ∈ {0, . . . , m-1}. By theWEEP for player 2, we get identically the unique solution p2(j) = 1m
for each strategy j ∈ { 0, . . . , m-1 }.
“⇒”: We now show that the conditions are necessary for uniqueness. The conditions do not hold
if and only if (there exists even m ≥ 4 with F ( 2
m
)
= b or F
(
2
m−2
)
≥ b) or (there exists odd m ≥ 5
with F
(
2
m−1
)
≥ b).
(1) If m is even, m ≥ 4 and F ( 2
m
)
= b, then
σ(p1) = {i ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1} : i even}, p1(i) = 2m for all i ∈ σ(p1)
σ(p2) = {j ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1} : j odd}, p2(j) = 2m for all j ∈ σ(p2)
is an F-equilibrium. |σ(p1)| = |σ(p2)| = m2 , and p is uniform on σ(pk) for k ∈ [2].
For example, for m = 4 and F
(
1
2
)
= b we get:

(a, b) (b,a) (b, b) (b,b)
(b, b) (a, b) (b, a) (b, b)
(b, b) (b,b) (a, b) (b,a)
(b, a) (b, b) (b, b) (a, b)
 .
(2) If m is even, m ≥ 4 and F
(
2
m−2
)
≥ b, then
σ(p1) = {i : m2 ≤ i ≤ m− 2}, p1(i) = 2m−2 for all i ∈ σ(p1)
σ(p2) = {j : 0 ≤ j ≤ m2 − 2}, p2(j) = 2m−2 for all j ∈ σ(p2)
is an F-equilibrium. |σ(p1)| = |σ(p2)| = m−22 , and p is uniform on σ(pk) for k ∈ [2].
For example, for m = 6 and F
(
1
2
) ≥ b we get:
(a, b) (b, a) (b, b) (b, b) (b, b) (b, b)
(b, b) (a, b) (b, a) (b, b) (b, b) (b, b)
(b, b) (b, b) (a, b) (b, a) (b, b) (b, b)
(b,b) (b,b) (b, b) (a, b) (b, a) (b, b)
(b,b) (b,b) (b, b) (b, b) (a, b) (b, a)
(b, a) (b, b) (b, b) (b, b) (b, b) (a, b)

.
(3) If m is odd, m ≥ 5 and F
(
2
m−1
)
≥ b, then
σ(p1) =
{
i : m−12 ≤ i ≤ m− 2
}
, p1(i) =
2
m−1 for all i ∈ σ(p1)
σ(p2) =
{
j : 0 ≤ j ≤ m−32
}
, p2(i) =
2
m−1 for all j ∈ σ(p2)
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is an F-equilibrium. |σ(p1)| = |σ(p2)| = m−12 , and p is uniform on σ(pk) for k ∈ [2].
For example, for m = 5 and F
(
1
2
) ≥ b we get:

(a, b) (b, a) (b, b) (b, b) (b, b)
(b, b) (a, b) (b, a) (b, b) (b, b)
(b,b) (b,b) (a, b) (b, a) (b, b)
(b,b) (b,b) (b, b) (a, b) (b, a)
(b, a) (b, b) (b, b) (b, b) (a, b)
 .
This completes the proof.
We now proceed to prove the inexistence result. Game Cm is a 2-values, (m+1)-strategies bimatrix
game, with m ≥ 2, which is derived by adding one row and one column to game Dm, as follows:
Cm =

(a, b)
(b, b)
Dm
...
(b, b)
(b, b) (b, b) . . . (b, b) (b, b) (b, a)

.
Thus, Cm = (αij , βij)0≤i,j≤m, where:
αij , βij for 0 ≤ i, j ≤ m− 1 are defined as in the definition of Dm,
αmj = αim = b for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 0 ≤ j ≤ m,
α0m = a,
βmj = βim = b for 0 ≤ i ≤ m− 1, 0 ≤ j ≤ m− 1, and
βmm = a.
Clearly, Cm is a normal game. Due to the structure of Cm, there hold two properties with corre-
sponding consequences to Properties (1) and (2) from Lemma 3.6:
• αmj = b for all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m}. Thus, µ1(m, j) = b for all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m}. Taking î := m,
this implies Property (1) from Lemma 3.6 for any mixed profile (p1, p2) with m ∈ σ(p1).
βim = b for all i ∈ {0, . . . ,m−1}. Thus, µ2(i,m) = b for all i ∈ {0, . . . ,m−1}. Taking ĵ := m,
this implies Property (1) from Lemma 3.6 for any mixed profile (p1, p2) with m ∈ σ(p2) and
m 6∈ σ(p1).
• Since Cm is a normal game, any mixed profile (p1, p2) fulfills Property (2) from Lemma 3.6.
We show:
Theorem 4.3 Let m ≥ 2. Consider a unimodal valuation F. Cm has no F-equilibrium if and only
if F
(
1
m
)
> b and one of the following conditions holds:
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(i) m is even, F(x) < b for x ≥ 2
m
,
(ii) m is odd, F
(
2
m+1
)
6= b and F(x) < b for x ≥ 2
m−1 .
Proof. We first prove that the conditions are sufficient for non-existence. In the proof we will make
use of the following observation: if F(z) < b then F(x) decreases strictly monotone for x ∈ (z, 1);
in particular, if F(z) < b and z < x, then F(x) < b.
“⇐”: Assume, by way of contradiction, that Cm has an F-equilibrium 〈p1, p2〉 with m 6∈ σ(p1)
and m 6∈ σ(p2). Due to the structure of Cm, it follows that 〈p1, p2〉 is an F-equilibrium for Dm.
Since F(x) < b for x ≥ 2
m
, with m even, or x ≥ 2
m−1 , with m odd, by the above observation
and Theorem 4.1, it follows that p1(j) = p2(j) =
1
m
with 0 ≤ j ≤ m − 1. This implies that
x1(p1, p2) =
1
m
. Thus, V1(p1, p2) = F
(
1
m
)
> b. Then, player 1 could improve by switching to
strategy m with V(pm1 , p2) = b. A contradiction.
Assume now that there is an F-equilibrium 〈p1, p2〉 with m ∈ σ(p1) or m ∈ σ(p2). Since game Cm
is normal, as mentioned above, Property (2) from Lemma 3.6 is fulfilled. There remain two cases
to consider.
(1) m ∈ σ(p1): Then (σ(p1)\{m}, σ(p2)\{m}) is a b-block for player 1. This leads to two subcases:
(1.1) (σ(p1) \ {m}, σ(p2) \ {m}) is a b-double-block: This implies that m /∈ σ(p2), hence
|σ(p2) \ {m}| = |σ(p2)|. From Lemma 4.2 we have that |σ(p1) \ {m}| + |σ(p2) \ {m}| ≤
m − 1. Hence, |σ(p1)| + |σ(p2)| ≤ m. Let k ∈ [2] with |σ(pk)| ≤ |σ(pk¯)|. Then
|σ(pk)| ≤ ⌊m2 ⌋. If m is even (resp., odd), then |σ(pk)| ≤ m2 and by assumption F(x) < b
for x ≥ 2
m
(resp., |σ(pk)| ≤ m−12 and by assumption F(x) < b for x ≥ 2m−1 ). In both
cases, F(x) < b for x ≥ 1|σ(pk)| . Lemma 3.6 implies that pk¯ is not an F-best response to
pk. A contradiction.
(1.2) (σ(p1) \ {m}, σ(p2) \ {m}) is not a b-block for player 2: Then, for every j ∈ σ(p2) there
exists i ∈ σ(p1) with βij = a. For j ∈ σ(p2) \ {m} we get that (j − 1) mod m ∈
σ(p2) \ {m} and hence |σ(p2) \ {m}| ≤ |σ(p1¯) \ {m}|. Lemma 4.2 implies that |σ(p1) \
{m}|+ |σ(p2) \ {m}| ≤ m. We consider two subcases:
(1.2.1) m /∈ σ(p2): Then |σ(p1)|+|σ(p2)| ≤ m+1 and |σ(p2)| ≤ |σ(p1)|−1. Thus, 2·|σ(p2)| ≤
|σ(p1)| + |σ(p2)| − 1 ≤ m, which yields |σ(p2)| ≤ ⌊m2 ⌋. Following the exact same
reasoning as in case (1.1) and using Lemma 3.6, we conclude that p1 is not an F-best
response to p2. A contradiction.
(1.2.2) m ∈ σ(p2): Because of the non-symmetry of Cm we now need to employ new ideas.
Observe that m ∈ σ(p2) implies 0 /∈ σ(p1) (since α0m = a and (σ(p1) \ {m}, σ(p2) \
{m}) is a b-block for player 1). We distinguish two subcases:
(1.2.2.1) 0 /∈ σ(p2): For i ∈ {0, . . . ,m − 1}, i ∈ σ(p1) implies i /∈ σ(p2). Hence, (σ(p1) \
{m}) ∩ (σ(p2) \ {m}) = ∅. Furthermore, σ(p1) \ {m} ⊆ {1, . . . ,m − 1}, σ(p2 \
{m} ⊆ {1, . . . ,m − 1} implies |σ(p1) \ {m}| + |σ(p2) \ {m}| ≤ m − 1, which
implies |σ(p1)| + |σ(p2)| ≤ m + 1, and hence |σ(p2)| ≤ ⌊m+12 ⌋. We distinguish
between m even and m odd.
– If m is even, then |σ(p2)| ≤ m2 and by assumption F(x) < b for x ≥ 2m . Hence,
F(x) < b for x ≥ 1|σ(p2)| . Lemma 3.6 implies that p1 is not an F-best response
to p2. A contradiction.
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– If m is odd, then |σ(p2)| ≤ m+12 . We have two subcases, |σ(p2)| < m+12 and
|σ(p2)| = m+12 .
+ |σ(p2)| ≤ m+12 − 1: By assumption, F(x) < b for x ≥ 2m−1 . Therefore,
F(x) < b for x ≥ 1|σ(p2)| . Lemma 3.6 implies that p1 is not an F-best
response to p2. A contradiction.
+ |σ(p2)| = m+12 : By assumption, F
(
2
m+1
)
6= b. If F
(
2
m+1
)
< b, then
Lemma 3.6 implies that p1 is not an F-best response to p2. A contradic-
tion. For F
(
2
m+1
)
> b, the WEEP implies that p1(i) =
2
m
for all i ∈ σ(p1).
Thus V2(p1, p2) = F
(
2
m
)
> b and hence player 2 can improve by using some
strategy j /∈ σ(p2). A contradiction.
(1.2.2.2) 0 ∈ σ(p2): Then, |σ(p1) \ {m}| + |σ(p2) \ {m}| ≤ m, which implies, |σ(p1)| +
|σ(p2)| ≤ m + 2, and hence |σ(p2)| ≤ ⌊m+22 ⌋. Unlike the previous cases, we do
not get the optimal result by just applying Lemma 3.6. Instead, we will show,
by using the method in the proof of Lemma 3.6, that p1 is not an F-best response
to p2 if F(x) < b for x ≥ 1|σ(p2)|−1 , deriving a contradiction.
For every j ∈ {0, . . . ,m} there is exactly one strategy i ∈ {0, . . . ,m − 1} with
αij = a, call it i(j). Then, for every strategy j ∈ σ(p2), i(j) ∈ σ(p1). It is i(0) =
i(m) = 0 and i(j1) 6= i(j2) for j1 6= j2 6= 0. Then, V1(p01, p2) = F(p2(0) + p2(m))
and for j ∈ σ(p2) \ {0,m}, V1(pi(j)1 , p2) = F(p2(j)). Then, p2(0) + p2(m) ≥
1
|σ(p2)|−1
or there exists some j ∈ σ(p2) \ {0,m} with p2(j) ≥ 1|σ(p2)|−1 . So, when
F(x) < b for x ≥ 1|σ(p2)|−1 , player 1 can improve by switching either to strategy
0 or to a strategy i(j) with p2(j) ≥ 1|σ(p2)|−1 . Recall that |σ(p2)| ≤ ⌊m+22 ⌋. So,
player 1 can improve for F
(
1
⌊m
2
⌋
)
< b. A contradiction.
To better understand this case, we provide an example with m = 4.
(a, b) (b, a) (b, b) (b, b) (a, b)
(b,b) (a, b) (b,a) (b, b) (b,b)
(b, b) (b, b) (a, b) (b, a) (b, b)
(b,a) (b, b) (b,b) (a, b) (b,b)
(b,b) (b, b) (b,b) (b, b) (b,a)

Then, σ(p1) = {1, 3, 4}, σ(p2) = {0, 2, 4}, p2(0) + p2(4) ≥ 12 or p2(2) ≥ 12 . For
F
(
1
2
)
< b, player 1 can improve by switching to strategy 0 or to strategy 2.
(2) m /∈ σ(p1), m ∈ σ(p2): Then (σ(p1), σ(p2)\{m}) is a b-block for player 2. We distinguish two
cases:
(2.1) (σ(p1), σ(p2) \ {m}) is a b-double-block: From Lemma 4.2 we have that |σ(p1)|+ |σ(p2)\
{m}| ≤ m − 1. Hence, |σ(p1)| + |σ(p2)| ≤ m. Let k ∈ [2] with |σ(pk)| ≤ |σ(pk¯)|.
Then |σ(pk)| ≤ ⌊m2 ⌋. Following exactly the same reasoning as in case (1.1) and using
Lemma 3.6, we conclude that pk¯ is not an F-best response to pk. A contradiction.
(2.2) (σ(p1), σ(p2) \ {m}) is not a b-block for player 1: Then, for every i ∈ σ(p1) there exists
j ∈ σ(p2) with αij = a, i.e., for i ∈ σ(p1) \ {0}, we get that i ∈ σ(p2). This implies that
σ(p1) \ {0} ⊆ σ(p2) \ {m}, and hence |σ(p1)| ≤ |σ(p2)|. Lemma 4.2 implies |σ(p1)| +
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|σ(p2) \ {m}| ≤ m, which implies |σ(p1)|+ |σ(p2)| ≤ m+ 1, and hence |σ(p1)| ≤ ⌊m+12 ⌋.
Following exactly the same reasoning as in case (1.2.2.1), we reach a contradiction.
“⇒”: We now show that the conditions are necessary, that is, if they do not hold, then there is an
F-equilibrium. We first show the necessity of F
(
1
m
)
> b. If F
(
1
m
) ≤ b then Cm has an F-equilibrium
〈p1, p2〉 with
σ(p1) = {i ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1}}, p1(i) = 1m for all i ∈ σ(p1)
σ(p2) = {j ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1}}, p2(j) = 1m for all j ∈ σ(p2)
|σ(p1)| = |σ(p2)| = m, and p is uniform on σ(pk) for k ∈ [2] (this is the case m /∈ σ(p1) and
m /∈ σ(p2)).
Then, given that F
(
1
m
)
> b, the remaining conditions do not hold if and only if (there exists m
even with F
(
2
m
) ≥ b) or (there exists m odd with F( 2
m+1
)
= b or F
(
2
m−1
)
≥ b).
(1) For m even and F
(
2
m
) ≥ b, Cm has an F-equilibrium 〈p1, p2〉 with
σ(p1) = {m} ∪ {i : m2 ≤ i ≤ m− 2},
σ(p2) = {j : 0 ≤ j ≤ m2 − 1},
|σ(p1)| = |σ(p2)| = m2 , and p is uniform on σ(pk) for k ∈ [2].
Observe that we are in case (1.1): m ∈ σ(p1), m /∈ σ(p2), and (σ(p1) \ {m}, σ(p2) \ {m}) is a
b-double-block.
For example, form = 4 and the above case, C4 =

(a, b) (b, a) (b, b) (b, b) (a, b)
(b, b) (a, b) (b, a) (b, b) (b, b)
(b,b) (b,b) (a, b) (b, a) (b, b)
(b, a) (b, b) (b, b) (a, b) (b, b)
(b,b) (b,b) (b, b) (b, b) (b, a)
 .
(2) For m odd and F
(
2
m+1
)
= b, Cm has an F-equilibrium 〈p1, p2〉 with
σ(p1) = {i ∈ {0, . . . ,m} : i odd},
σ(p2) = {m} ∪ {j ∈ 2, . . . ,m− 1} : j even},
|σ(p1)| = |σ(p2)| = m+12 , and p is uniform on σ(pk) for k ∈ [2].
Observe that we are in case (1.2.2.1): m ∈ σ(p1), m ∈ σ(p2), and 0 /∈ σ(p2).
For example, for m = 5 and the above case, C5 =
(a, b) (b, a) (b, b) (b, b) (b, b) (a, b)
(b, b) (a, b) (b,a) (b, b) (b,b) (b,b)
(b, b) (b, b) (a, b) (b, a) (b, b) (b, b)
(b, b) (b, b) (b,b) (a, b) (b,a) (b,b)
(b, a) (b, b) (b, b) (b, b) (a, b) (b, b)
(b, b) (b, b) (b,b) (b, b) (b,b) (b,a)

.
(3) For m odd and F
(
2
m−1
)
≥ b, Cm has an F-equilibrium 〈p1, p2〉 with
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σ(p1) = {m} ∪ {i : m+12 ≤ i ≤ m− 2},
σ(p2) = {j : 0 ≤ j ≤ m−32 },
|σ(p1)| = |σ(p2)| = m−12 , and p is uniform on σ(pk) for k ∈ [2].
Observe that we are again in case (1.1): m ∈ σ(p1), m /∈ σ(p2), and (σ(p1)\{m}, σ(p2)\{m})
is a b-double-block.
For example, for m = 5 and the above case, C5 =
(a, b) (b, a) (b, b) (b, b) (b, b) (a, b)
(b, b) (a, b) (b, a) (b, b) (b, b) (b, b)
(b, b) (b, b) (a, b) (b, a) (b, b) (b, b)
(b,b) (b,b) (b, b) (a, b) (b, a) (b, b)
(b, a) (b, b) (b, b) (b, b) (a, b) (b, b)
(b,b) (b,b) (b, b) (b, b) (b, b) (b, a)

.
This completes the proof.
Now, putting together the results of Theorems 3.8 and 4.3, we obtain a panorama on the
(in)existence of F-equilibria, summarized in the following theorem:
Theorem 4.4 For a unimodal valuation F the following properties hold:
(i) If x0(F) = 0 then an F-equilibrium exists for all 2-players, 2-values games and its computation
is PPAD-hard.
(ii) If x0(F) > 0 and F
(
1
2
)
6= b, then there exists a normal 2-players, 2-values game without
F-equilibrium.
Proof. Property (i) follows directly from Theorem 3.8. Now consider the case x0(F) > 0 and
F
(
1
2
) 6= b. Then, x1 = x1(F) exists with F(x1) = b. Choose m ∈ N with 1m < x1(F) ≤ 1m−1 . Then,
F
(
1
m
)
> b, F
(
1
m−1
)
≤ b and F(x) decreases strictly monotone for x ∈
[
1
m−1 , 1
]
. We distinguish
between m even and m odd.
• If m ≥ 4 is even, then 2
m
> 1
m−1 and hence F
(
2
m
)
< F
(
1
m−1
)
≤ b. For m = 2, we have
F
(
2
m
)
= F(1) = a < b.
• If m ≥ 5 is odd, then F
(
2
m−1
)
< F
(
1
m−1
)
≤ b. Furthermore, F
(
2
m+1
)
6= b (otherwise,
x1(F) =
2
m+1 >
1
m−1 , contradicting the choice of m s.t. x1(F) ≤ 1m−1 ). For m = 3 we have
F
(
2
m−1
)
= F(1) = a < b; furthermore, 2
m+1 =
1
2 , and by assumption, F
(
1
2
) 6= b.
So, for allm ≥ 2, the conditions of Theorem 4.3 hold, and hence the game Cm has no F-equilibrium.
Theorem 4.4 leaves open the case on whether there exists, or not, an F-equilibrium when F
(
1
2
)
= b.
This is the subject of Section 5.
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5 Existence of Equilibria
In this section we show the existence of equilibria for a 2-players, 2-values game G when G is a
normal game with F
(
1
2
)
= b (Section 5.1) and when players have three strategies (Section 5.2),
complementing the investigation of the previous section.
5.1 Normal Games with F
(
1
2
)
= b
We now consider normal games. Specifically, in this section G is a normal 2-players game with two
values a, b, a < b. Furthermore, we assume that F
(
1
2
)
= b.
Recall that in a normal game, for each row i there is exactly one column j with βij = a, and
for each column j there is exactly one row i with αij = a. For convenience of presentation, in this
section we define the set of strategies over the set [n] = {1, . . . , n}. Then, for i ∈ [n] let col(i) be the
uniquely determined column with βicol(i) = a. For j ∈ [n] let row(j) be the uniquely determined
row with αrow(j)j = a. Set:
C = {col(i) : i ∈ [n]} and R = {row(j) : j ∈ [n]}.
Note that in a normal game, always |C| ≥ 2, |R| ≥ 2 holds. To see this, assume that |C| = 1;
then ∃j ∀i : γ(i, j) = (b, a). But in a normal game γ(row(j), j) = (a, b), a contradiction. In the
same way |R| ≥ 2 follows.
In the remainder of the section we will show that G always has an F-equilibrium whose support
sets both have size 2, and that this equilibrium can be computed in linear time, with respect to
the input of the problem (Theorem 5.7 and Corollary 5.8).
For the complexity consideration we use the condensed input form where the game is given by
the the two arrays Col and Row with Col(i) = col(i) and Row(i) = row(i) for all i ∈ [n]. Using
this input convention, the sets C and R, represented as Boolean arrays, can be computed in time
O(n). We will show that a winning pair (c.f. Definition 5.1) can be found in time O(n). Note
that if the input is given by the two matrices (αij)1≤i,j≤n, (βij)1≤i,j≤n, then the input needs O(n
2)
space. In this case, the arrays Col and Row can be computed in time O(n2) and using afterwards
our algorithm leads to an algorithm for computing a winning pair in time O(n2). Since the input
is of size O(n2), this is also a linear time algorithm. We now define the notion of a winning pair.
Definition 5.1 (Winning Pair) A pair (σ1, σ2) with σ1, σ2 ⊆ [n], |σ1| = |σ2| = 2,
σ1 = {i1, i2}, σ2 = {j1, j2} is called a winning pair if the three following conditions are
fulfilled:
(i)
(
αi1j1 αi1j2
αi2j1 αi2j2
)
and
(
βi1j1 βi1j2
βi2j1 βi2j2
)
have the form
(
a b
b a
)
or
(
b a
a b
)
or
(
b b
b b
)
(ii) row(j1) 6= row(j2)
(iii) col(i1) 6= col(i2)
We first show:
Lemma 5.1 Let (σ1, σ2), σ1 = {i1, i2}, σ2 = {j1, j2} be a winning pair and define a strategy vector
〈p1, p2〉 by p1,i1 = p1,i2 = 1/2, p2,j1 = p2,j2 = 1/2. Then, 〈p1, p2〉 is an F-equilibrium.
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Proof. By assumption, F
(
1
2
)
= b and therefore V1(p1, p2) = V2(p1, p2) = b.
If player 1 chooses an arbitrary pure strategy i, then, due to condition (ii), player 1 has two b’s
or one a and one b. So V1(p
i
1, p2) = b for all i ∈ [n]. Hence, player 1 cannot improve by choosing
strategy i. Likewise, due to condition (iii), player 2 cannot improve by choosing an arbitrary pure
strategy j.
In the following lemmas we will show results about the distribution of (a, b) entries and (b, a) entries
in the case where there exists no winning pair.
Lemma 5.2 Let the two pairs σ1 = {i1, i2}, σ2 = {j1, j2} fulfill the following properties:
(i) {i1, i2} ∩ {row(j1), row(j2)} = ∅
{j1, j2} ∩ {col(i1), col(i2)} = ∅
(ii) row(j1) 6= row(j2)
(iii) col(i1) 6= col(i2)
Then, σ1 × σ2 is a winning pair.
Proof. Observe that properties (ii) and (iii) are equal to the conditions (ii) and (iii) of Defini-
tion 5.1. Therefore, only condition (i) has to be verified.
• αrow(jv)jv = a for v ∈ {1, 2} and normality implies that αijv = b for all i 6= row(jv). So the
first line of property (i) implies that αiµjv = b for µ, v ∈ {1, 2}.
• βivcol(iv) = a for v ∈ {1, 2} and normality implies that βivj = b for all j 6= col(iv). So the
second line of property (i) implies that βiµjv = b for µ, v ∈ {1, 2}.
The proof is demonstrated in Figure 1.
row(j1)
row(j2)
i1
i2
j1 j2 col(i1)col(i2)
(a, b)
(a, b)
(b, a)
(b, a)(b, b) (b, b)
(b, b) (b, b)
Figure 1: Demonstrating the proof of Lemma 5.2.
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Lemma 5.3 There exists an algorithm running in time O(n) with the following input-output rela-
tion.
(i) input: j1, j2 ∈ [n] with row(j1) 6= row(j2)
output:
(i/1) column j ∈ [n] such that {col(i) : i 6= row(j1), i 6= row(j2)} ⊂ {j1, j2, j}, or
(i/2) rows i1, i2 ∈ [n], i1 6= i2, such that {i1, i2} × {j1, j2} is a winning pair.
(ii) input: i1, i2 ∈ [n] with col(i1) 6= col(i2)
output:
(ii/1) row i ∈ [n] such that {row(j) : j 6= col(i1), j 6= col(i2)} ⊂ {i1, i2, i}, or
(ii/2) columns j1, j2 ∈ [n], j1 6= j2, such that {i1, i2} × {j1, j2} is a winning pair.
Proof. Due to the symmetry of rows and columns, it is sufficient to prove part (i).
We describe the algorithm, that starts with the input j1, j2 with row(j1) 6= row(j2):
• It checks col(i), i ∈ [n].
• If ∃j ∈ [n] with {col(i) : i 6= row(j1), i 6= row(j2)} ⊂ {j1, j2, j} then it exists (i/1) and
outputs j.
• Otherwise the algorithm has found some A ⊆ [n] with |A| = 2, A ∩ {j1, j2} = ∅ and A ⊆
{i : i 6= row(j1), i 6= row(j2)}. Take some i1, i2 with A = {col(i1), col(i2)}. Then
col(i1) 6= col(i2). Due to Lemma 5.2, {i1, i2} × {j1, j2} is a winning pair. Therefore, the
algorithm exits (i/2) and outputs i1, i2.
The algorithm makes its decision following just one scan of col(i), i ∈ [n]. So, the time bound is
O(n).
Lemma 5.4 There exists an algorithm that computes a winning pair in time O(n) provided that
n ≥ 5 and (|R| ≥ 4 or |C| ≥ 4).
Proof. Due to the symmetry of rows and columns, it is sufficient to describe the algorithm in the
case that |R| ≥ 4.
• The algorithm scans row(j), j ∈ [n] and determines jv, v ∈ [4], with |{row(jv) : v ∈ [n]}| = 4.
• Then it simulates the algorithm described in the proof of Lemma 5.3 for the six 2-sets
{jv , jµ}, v 6= µ, v, µ ∈ [4].
Overall, the algorithm runs in time O(n). In the remainder of the proof we will show that in the
case n ≥ 5, for at least one of the pairs {jv , jµ} exit (i/2) is reached, and thus a winning pair is
found.
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We will do so, by proof by contradiction: assume that n ≥ 5 and for all six 2-sets {jv , jµ} exit
(i/1) is reached.
Let jv , v ∈ [4], with |{row(jv) : v ∈ [4]}| = 4. We apply Lemma 5.3 six times, i.e., for
each pair {jv , jµ}, v 6= µ, v, µ ∈ [4]. Due to Lemma 5.3, there exist constructs j{v,µ} such that
col(i) ∈ {jv , jµ, j{v,µ}} for all i 6∈ {row(jµ), row(jv)}.
First choose i 6∈ {row(jµ) : µ ∈ [4]}. To be able to do this, we need the assumption that
n ≥ 5. For each 2-set {µ, v} ⊂ [4] we denote with {µ, v} the complement of {µ, v} in [4]. Then,
due to Lemma 5.3,
col(i) ∈ ({jk : k ∈ {µ, v}} ∪ {j{v,µ}}) ∩ ({jk : k ∈ {µ, v}} ∪ {j{v,µ}}).
Since {µ, v} ∩ {µ, v} = ∅, this implies that col(i) = j{v,µ} = j{v,µ}. Now, since the 2-set {µ, v} ⊂ [4]
were chosen arbitrarily, this shows that all the j{v,µ}, {v, µ} ⊂ [4] have the same value. Let this
value be jˆ, i.e., col(i) = jˆ for i 6∈ {row(jµ) : µ ∈ [4]}.
Now consider i = row(jρ) for some ρ ∈ [4]. Then information about col(i) is given by Lemma 5.3
using the 3 pairs {µ, v} ⊂ [4], ρ 6∈ {µ, v}, i.e., for all i ∈ [n], col(i) ∈
⋂
{µ,v}⊂[4]\{ρ}
{jµ, jv , jˆ} = jˆ,
contradicting the fact that |C| ≥ 2 (since the game is normal).
Lemma 5.5 There exists an algorithm that computes a winning pair in time O(n), provided that
|{col(i) : i 6∈ R}| ≥ 2, and |{row(j) : j 6∈ C}| ≥ 2.
Proof. We describe the algorithm: it scans col(i), row(i), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and determines
i1, i2 6∈ R with col(i1) 6= col(i2) and j1, j2 6∈ C with row(j1) 6= row(j2). This takes O(n) time. Since
i1, i2 6∈ R, {i1, i2} ∩ {row(j1), row(j2)} = ∅, and since j1, j2 6∈ C, {j1, j2} ∩ {col(i1), col(i2)} = ∅.
Therefore, due to Lemma 5.2, {i1, i2} × {j1, j2} is a winning pair.
Lemma 5.6 If n = 4 and ((|C| = 4 and |R| ≤ 3) or (|R| = 4 and |C| ≤ 3)), then there exists a
winning pair.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that |C| = 4 and |R| ≤ 3. Now, we order the rows so
that R = {1, 2, 3}, and we order the columns so that γii = (b, a) for all i ∈ [4], i.e., row(j) = j for
all j ∈ [4]. If |R| = 2, then col(1) = 2, col(2) = 1 and γij = (b, b) for i ∈ {3, 4}, j ∈ {1, 2}. So,
{3, 4} × {1, 2} is a winning pair.
Now let |R| = 3. Then,
G =

(b, a) · · ·
· (b, a) · ·
· · (b, a) ·
(b, b) (b, b) (b, b) (b, a)
 .
We give special attention to the diagonal block
Di =
(
γii γi(i+1)
γ(i+1)i γ(i+1)(i+1)
)
for i ∈ [3].
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Recall that γii = (b, a) for all i ∈ [4]. We say that Di is of type 1 if γi(i+1) = γ(i+1)i = (a, b) and
of type 2 if γi(i+1) = γ(i+1)i = (b, b). Note that Di is a winning pair if and only if Di is of type 1
or (Di is of type 2 and row(i) 6= row(i+ 1)). We will construct all matrices whose 2× 2 diagonal
blocks are not a winning pair and name the winning pair of these matrices. The proof is divided
into two steps:
(1) In the first step we construct all matrices without 2 × 2 diagonal blocks of type 1 or type
2. Note that in this case, γ34 = (a, b) and γi4 = (b, b) for i ∈ [2] and that the matrix is
determined uniquely by γ12. There are two cases:
(1.1) γ12 = (a, b). Then

(b, a) (b, b) (a, b) (b, b)
(a,b) (b, a) (b, b) (b,b)
(b,b) (a, b) (b, a) (a,b)
(b, b) (b, b) (b, b) (b, a)
 and {2, 3} × {1, 4} is a winning
pair.
(1.2) γ12 = (b, b). Then

(b, a) (a,b) (b, b) (b,b)
(b, b) (b, a) (a, b) (b, b)
(a, b) (b,b) (b, a) (a,b)
(b, b) (b, b) (b, b) (b, a)
 and {1, 3} × {2, 4} is a winning
pair.
(2) In this step we allow in the construction of the matrices no blocks Di of type 1 and a block
of type 2 only if row(i) = row(i+ 1). Since |R| = 3, only one such i can exist. Furthermore,
if row(3) 6= row(4), then row(4) = 3. There are four cases:
(2.1) row(1) = row(2). Then, row(1) = row(2) = 3, which implies that row(4) = 3. But
then |R| ≤ 2, a contradiction.
(2.2) row(2) = row(3). Then, row(2) = row(3) = 1, which implies that row(4) = 3 and
row(1) = 2. Hence, γ12 = γ21 = (a, b), and thus, D1 is of type 1.
(2.3) row(3) = row(4) = 1. Then γ23 = (b, b) and this determines the matrix uniquely:
(b, a) (b, b) (a, b) (a, b)
(a, b) (b,a) (b, b) (b,b)
(b, b) (a, b) (b, a) (b, b)
(b, b) (b,b) (b, b) (b,a)
 and {1, 3} × {2, 4} is a winning pair.
(2.4) row(3) = row(4) = 2. Then γ23 = (a, b) and this determines the matrix uniquely:
(b,a) (a, b) (b, b) (b,b)
(b, b) (b, a) (a, b) (a, b)
(a, b) (b, b) (b, a) (b, b)
(b,b) (b, b) (b, b) (b,a)
 and {1, 4} × {1, 4} is a winning pair.
So, up to reordering of rows and columns, there are 4 matrices for which no of the Di’s is a winning
pair. We have shown that these 4 matrices have a winning pair.
We are now ready to prove the key result.
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Theorem 5.7 Let G be a 2-players, 2-values, n-strategies normal game with n ≥ 4 and not n =
|C| = |R| = 4. Then a winning pair exists and can be found in time O(n).
Proof. Consider an algorithm that simulates the algorithms described in Lemmas 5.4 and 5.5. So
this algorithm finds a winning pair for n ≥ 5 and |R| ≥ 4 or |C| ≥ 4, or |{col(i) : i 6∈ R}| ≥ 2 and
|{row(j) : j 6∈ C}| ≥ 2. The case n = 4 and (|C| = 4 and |R| ≤ 3)) or (|R| = 4 and |C| ≤ 3))
is taken care by the construction described in Lemma 5.6. Because of the symmetry of rows and
columns we can assume now |R| ≤ 3 and |C| ≤ 3, and |{col(i) : i 6∈ R}| = 1.
In the proof we use some appropriate numbering of rows and columns. We are aware that
the algorithm would operate with the actual row and column numbers, but we feel that using the
renumbering allows for an easier understanding of the algorithmic idea.
By renumbering the columns we can obtain col(i) = 1 for i 6∈ R. By renumbering the rows and
the columns 2, . . . , n we can obtain additionally R = {1, 2} if |R| = 2 and R = {1, 2, 3} if |R| = 3,
and row(1) = 1, row(2) = 2. Note that in this setting γ(i, j) = (b, b) for all i ≥ 4, j ≥ 2. Figure 2
illustrates this initial setting.
❛
❛
❛
❛
❛
❛❛
1
(a, b)
(a, b)
(b, b)
(b, a)
(b, a)
2 3 4 5
1
2
3
4
5
R = {1, 2}
if |R| = 2
R = {1, 2, 3}
if |R| = 3
Figure 2: Illustrating the initial setting of the proof of Theorem 5.7.
Since we do not need the information whether |R| = 2 or |R| = 3 in this first part of the proof,
we make no assumptions about the entries in the third row at this stage of the proof.
Next we discuss the influence of the values col(1) and col(2). If col(1) = 2 and col2) = 1 or if
col(1) 6= 2 and col(2) 6= 1 and col(1) 6= col(2), then {1, 2} × {1, 2} is a winning pair. In both cases
row(1) 6= row(2) and col(1) 6= col(2). So, the following three cases remain:
(i) col(1) = 2, col(2) 6= 1
(ii) col(2) = 1, col(1) 6= 2
(iii) col(1) = col(2)
Case (ii) is the more elaborate case. We start by discussing cases (i) and (iii).
Cases (i)/(iii)
Here, in both cases, γ(2, 1) = (b, b) and col(2) = j ≥ 3, γ(2, j) = (b, a). Then {2, 4} × {1, j} is
a winning pair. This is true, since γ(4, 1) = (b, a), γ(4, j) = (b, b), col(4) = 1 6= j = col(2) and
row(1) = 2 6= row(j), since γ(2, j) = (b, a). This situation is illustrated in Figure 3.
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(b, b) (b, a)(a, b)
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2 col(2)
1
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4
5
Figure 3: Illustrating cases (i)/(iii) of the proof of Theorem 5.7.
Case (ii)
In this case γ(1, 2) = (b, b) and γ(2, 1) = (b, a). By renumbering the columns that are greater or
equal to 3, we can obtain that col(1) = 3, i.e., γ(1, 3) = (b, a). If row(3) = 2, then {1, 2} × {1, 3} is
a winning pair. This true since in this case γ(1, 1) = γ(2, 3) = (a, b) and γ(1, 3) = γ(2, 1) = (b, a),
and row(1) = 1 6= 2 = row(2) and col(1) = 3 6= 1 = col(1).
So, there remain the case row(3) 6= 2. It is row(3) 6= 1 since γ(1, 3) = (b, a). We are now in the
case |R| = 3 and row(3) = 3. This situation is illustrated in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Illustrating case (ii) of the proof of Theorem 5.7.
We now study the influence of col(3). If col(3) = 1, then {1, 3} × {1, 3} is a winning pair,
since γ(1, 1) = γ(3, 3) = (a, b) and γ(1, 3) = γ(3, 1) = (b, a), and row(1) = 1 6= 3 = row(3) and
col(1) = 3 6= 1 = col(3).
Now let col(3) = 2, i.e., γ(3, 1) = (b, b) and γ(3, 2) = (b, a). Then {3, 4} × {1, 2} is a winning
pair, since γ(3, 1) = γ(4, 2) = (b, b) and γ(3, 3) = γ(4, 1) = (a, b), and col(3) = 2 6= 1 = col(4) and
row(1) = 1 6= 2 = row(2).
Finally, consider the case col(3) ≥ 3. Since γ(3, 3) = (a, b) this implies that col(3) ≥ 4.
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Then γ(3, 2) = (b, b) and {2, 3} × {2, 3} is a winning pair, since γ(2, 2) = γ(3, 3) = (a, b) and
γ(2, 3) = γ(3, 2) = (b, b), and row(2)2 6= 3 = row(3) and col(2) = 1 6= col(3), completing proof of
the theorem.
Theorem 5.7, Lemma 5.1 and the definition of a winning pair (Definition 5.1) yield the following
result:
Corollary 5.8 Consider a 2-players, 2-values, n-strategies normal game G, and a unimodal valu-
ation F with F
(
1
2
)
= b. Then, G has an F-equilibrium that can be computed in O(n) time.
Remark: Observe that Theorem 5.7 does not cover the cases n ≤ 3 and n = |R| = |C| = 4.
However, we know from Theorem 5.9 (next section) that for n = 3 there always exists an F-
equilibrium with F
(
1
2
)
= b. From Corollary 3.5 we know that an F-equilibrium exists also for
n = 2. Regarding the case n = |R| = |C| = 4, the strategy vector p1i = p2i = 1/4 for i ∈ [n] is a
fully mixed equilibrium.
5.2 Three Strategies
Here we focus on two-players, two-values games with F
(
1
2
) ≤ b and 3 strategies (i.e., n = 3). In this
case we have a complete picture on the existence and inexistence of F-equilibria (c.f. Corollary 5.10).
We first show:
Theorem 5.9 Consider a unimodal valuation F with F
(
1
2
) ≤ b. Then, every 2-players, 2-values,
3-strategies game has an F-equilibrium.
Proof. We start with an E-equilibrium (p1, p2) for G. If |σ(p1)| = 1 or |σ(p2)| = 1, then, by
Lemma 2.3, there is also a pure equilibrium for G. So assume that |σ(pi)| ≥ 2 for each player
i ∈ [2]. By Lemma 2.4, assume, without loss of generality, that if for a player i ∈ [2], |σ(pi)| = 2,
then pi(j) =
1
2 for each strategy j ∈ σ(pi). If |σ(p1)| = |σ(p2)| = 3, then (p1, p2) is a fully mixed
E-equilibrium; hence, by Corollary 3.4, it is also an F-equilibrium. So assume, without loss of
generality, that |σ(p2)| = 2, with σ(p2) = {1, 2}. We distinguish two cases with respect to |σ(p1)|:
(A) |σ(p1)| = 2, with σ(p1) = {1, 2}: The idea of the proof is to show that (p1, p2) is also an
F-equilibrium. Since player 1 is E-constant on σ(p1), Lemma 3.2 implies that she is also
F-constant on σ(p1). So it remains to prove that player 1 cannot F-improve by switching to
strategy 3. By assumption, p2(1) = p2(2) =
1
2. We distinguish again the three cases from the
proof of Lemma 2.4:
(A/1) µ1(k, 1) = µ1(k, 2) = a for all k ∈ σ(p1): Then, x1(p1, p2) = 1, so that V1(p1, p2) =
F(1) = a. Thus, player 1 cannot F-improve.
(A/2) µ1(k, 1) = µ1(k, 2) = b for all k ∈ σ(p1): Then, x1(p1, p2) = 0, so that V1(p1, p2) =
F(0) = b. Since (p1, p2) is an E-equilibrium, it must also hold that µ1(3, 1) = µ1(3, 2) = b.
Thus, x1(p
3
1, p2) = 0, so that V1(p
3
1, p2) = F(0) = b, and player 1 cannot F-improve.
(A/3) µ1(k, 1) 6= µ1(k, 2) for all k ∈ σ(p1): Then, x1(p1, p2) = 12, so that V1(p1, p2) = F
(
1
2
)
.
Since player 1 is E-happy, there are only two cases (the case µ1(3, 1) = µ1(3, 2) = a is
excluded since in this case player 1 is not E-happy):
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(A/3/i) µ1(3, 1) 6= µ1(3, 2): Then, x1(p31, p2) = 12, so that V1(p31, p2) = F
(
1
2
)
. So, player 1
cannot F-improve.
(A/3/ii) µ1(3, 1) = µ1(3, 2) = b: Then, x1(p
3
1, p2) = 0, so that V1(p
3
1, p2) = F(0) = b. Since
F
(
1
2
)
≤ b, player 1 cannot F-improve.
So player 1 cannot F-improve by switching to strategy 3. Due to the symmetry between the
two players, player 2 cannot improve either by switching to strategy 3.
(B) |σ(p1)| = 3: Then, Corollary 3.4 implies that player 1 is F-happy. The idea of the proof is to
show that either (p1, p2) is also an F-equilibrium, or define a new probability distribution for
player 1 so that the resulting mixed profile is an F-equilibrium. The reason we can do this is the
following: Because of the Optimal-Value Property (c.f. Definition 2.2) player 1 is V-constant
on σ(p1); this together with Lemma 3.2 imply that V(p1, p2) = F(x1(p1, p2)) = F(x1(p
si
1 , p2))
for all si ∈ σ(p1). Now define a new mixed strategy p̂1 with σ(p̂1) ⊆ σ(p1). Then observe
that player 1 remains F-happy.
So, what it remains is to consider the F-happiness of player 2. By the WEEP for player 2,
E2(p1, p
1
2) = E2(p1, p
2
2). We use the following observation:
Since F
(
1
2
)
≤ b, F(y) ≥ F(z), for all y < z, z ≥ 1/2. (1)
Now, assume, without loss of generality, that µ2(1, 1) ≤ µ2(1, 2) ≤ µ2(1, 3). We distinguish
two cases:
(B/1) µ2(k, 1) = µ2(k, 2) for all strategies k ∈ [3]: There are three subcases:
(B/1/i) µ2(k, 1) = a for all strategies k ∈ [3]: Then, x2(p1, p2) = 1, so that V2(p1, p2) =
F(1) = a. So, player 2 cannot F-improve.
(B/1/ii) µ2(k, 1) = b for all strategies k ∈ [3]: Then, since σ(p2) = {1, 2}, E2(p1, p2) = b. By
assumption, (p1, p2) is an E-equilibrium. This implies that µ2(k, 3) = b for all
strategies k ∈ [3] and V2(p1, p2) = V2(p1, p32) = F(0) = b. So, player 2 cannot
F-improve.
(B/1/iii) µ2(1, 1) = a and µ2(3, 1) = b: Since player 2 is E-happy with (p1, p2), E2(p1, p
1
2) ≤
E2(p1, p
3
2). There are two subcases to consider:
• µ2(2, 1) = a: Then, µ2 =
 a a ∗a a ∗
b b ∗
, where
an ∗ is an arbitrary value from {a, b}.
By assumption, (p1, p2) is an E-Equilibrium. This implies that there is
some i ∈ [3] with µ(i, 3) = b. Define a new probability distribution p̂1 for player
1 by p̂1(k) = 1/3, for all k ∈ [3]. Then, V2(p̂1, p2) = F
(
2
3
)
and V2(p̂1, p
3
2) = F(x)
with some x ≤ 2/3. By observation (1), F(x) ≥ F
(
2
3
)
. Hence, (p̂1, p2) is an
F-equilibrium, since player 2 cannot F-improve by switching to strategy 3.
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• µ2(2, 1) = b: Then, µ2 =
 a a ∗b b ∗
b b ∗
. If µ2(1, 3) = a, then µ2(2, 3) =
µ2(3, 3) = b, since otherwise player 2 could E-improve by choosing strategy
3, contradicting the assumption that (p1, p2) is an E-Equilibrium.
So, consider now the case that µ2(1, 3) = b. Define a new probability distribution
p̂1 for player 1 by p̂1(1) = 1/2, and p̂1(2) = p̂1(3) = 1/4. Then, V2(p̂1, p2) =
F
(
1
2
)
and V2(p̂1, p
3
2) = F(x) with some x ≤ 1/2. By observation (1), F(x) ≥
F
(
1
2
)
. Hence, (p̂1, p2) is an F-equilibrium, since player 2 cannot F-improve by
switching to strategy 3.
(B/2) There is a strategy k̂ ∈ [3] with µ2(k̂, 1) 6= µ2(k̂, 2): By Lemmas 2.2 and 3.3, it follows
that no strategy in σ(p2) dominates some other strategy in σ(p2) with respect to σ(p1).
Hence, there is at least one other k˜ ∈ [3] with µ2(k˜, 1) 6= µ2(k˜, 2). By the WEEP for
player 2, E2(p1, p
1
2) = E2(p1, p
2
2). We distinguish four cases, each represented by the
matrix (µ2(k, j))1≤k,j≤3, where, as before, ∗ is an arbitrary value from {a, b}:
(B/2/i) µ2 =
 a a ∗a b ∗
b a ∗
: By assumption, (p1, p2) is an E-Equilibrium. This implies
that there is some i ∈ [3] with µ(i, 3) = b. Define a new probability distribution
p̂1 for player 1 by p̂1(k) = 1/3, for all k ∈ [3]. Then, V2(p̂1, p2) = F
(
2
3
)
and
V2(p̂1, p
3
2) = F(x) with some x ≤ 2/3. As in case (B/1/iii), and by observation (1),
we conclude that player 2 cannot F-improve by switching to strategy 3.
(B/2/ii,iii) We consider two subcases:
• µ2 =
 a b ∗a b ∗
b a ∗
: TheWEEP for player 2 implies p1(1)+p1(2) = p1(3) = 1/2.
Thus, V2(p1, p2) = F
(
1
2
)
. If µ2(3, 3) = a, then (p1, p2) being an E-equilibrium
implies that µ2(1, 3) = µ2(2, 3) = b. Thus, (p1, p2) is also an F-equilibrium.
If µ2(3, 3) = b, then V2(p1, p
3
2) = F(x) with some x ≤ 1/2 and hence, by obser-
vation (1), player 2 cannot F-improve by switching to strategy 3.
• µ2 =
 a b ∗b a ∗
b a ∗
: This case is equivalent to the above case, by interchanging
the first and second columns and the first and third rows.
(B/2/iv) µ2 =
 a b ∗b a ∗
b b ∗
: The WEEP for player 2 implies p1(1) = p1(2). Since (p1, p2) is
an E-equilibrium, then µ2(i, 3) = a for at most one value of i ∈ [3]. Define a new
probability distribution p̂1 for player 1. We distinguish two cases:
• If µ2(i, 3) = a for exactly one value i ∈ [3] or if F
(
1
3
)
≤ b, then p̂1 = 1/3 for
all k ∈ [3]. Then V2(p̂1, p2) = F
(
1
3
)
and player 2 cannot F-improve by choosing
strategy 3.
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• If µ2(i, 3) = b for all i ∈ [3] and F
(
1
3
)
> b, then set σ(p̂1) = {1, 2} and
p̂1(1) = p̂1(2) = 1/2. Player 1 cannot F-improve since V1(p
i
1, p2) has the same
value for all i ∈ [3], and player 2 cannot F-improve since V2(p̂1, p2) = F
(
1
2
)
≤ b
and V2(p̂1, p
3
2) = F(0) = b.
The claim follows.
Now observe that by Theorem 4.3 we conclude that the 2-players, 2-values and 3-strategies normal
game with bimatrix
C2 =
 (a, b) (b, a) (a, b)(b, a) (a, b) (b, b)
(b, b) (b, b) (b, a)
 ,
has no F-equilibrium when F
(
1
2
)
> b. This complements the result of Theorem 5.9. In conclusion,
for 2-players, 2-values games with 3 strategies we have:
Corollary 5.10 For a unimodal valuation F the following properties hold:
(i) If F
(
1
2
) ≤ b, then every 2-player, 2 values, 3-strategies game has an F-equilibrium.
(ii) If F
(
1
2
)
> b, then there exists a normal 2-player, 2 values, 3-strategies game without F-
equilibrium.
6 Conclusion
In this work we have investigated the (in)existence of equilibria for 2-players, 2-values games under
unimodal valuations. Our work is the first to adopt the combination of abstract settings of unimodal
valuations and 2-values sparse bimatrix games, such as normal games. Normal games are a class of
counterexample games, which provide a canonical way of the sparsest bimatrix games. Unimodal
valuations provide the simplest possible way of specifying a non-monotone valuation function.
Combining these two critical parameters enables the simplest modeling of sparsity and payoff
concavity.
The most striking open problem arising from the context of this paper is the special role of
the condition F(12) = b, documented for normal games by Theorem 4.4 and Corollary 5.8. Will
F(12) = b guarantee the existence of F-equilibria also under relaxed normality, e.g., by allowing two
a’s per row and column, respectively? Winning pairs are not necessarily F-equilibria in this case.
Another open problem is the complexity of computing F-equilibria for 2-values games. Very
likely the problem is NP -hard. The reductions given in [12, 13] rely on the Crawford game and do
not care about sparsity or the number of values. The Crawford game has 3 values. Reduction for
2-values games could rely on the games Cm, m ≥ 2.
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